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I. INTRODUCTION
Government transparency remains a touchstone of the American democratic
system.' The Freedom of Information Act of 19662 ("FOIA") stands as the
"most prominent expression of a profound national commitment to ensuring an
open government."' By requiring federal agencies to provide access to re-
quested documents, FOIA provides a vehicle for citizens and citizen groups to
gain access to government-held documentation.' At the heart of FOIA lies the
t J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
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love and support. Many thanks to Gregory Bailey for his valued advice and the editorial
board for their guidance.
I Dozens of commentators, government officials, and citizens alike have espoused the
value of transparency in order to maintain the integrity of the American political process and
ensure the accountability of government institutions. For example, President Barack Obama
noted, "A democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency. As
Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, 'sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.' " President
Barack Obama, Freedom of Information Act: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive De-
partments and Agencies, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress office/Freedomofinformationact/ (last visited May
14, 2011); see also William D. Cohan, Stonewalled by the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2010, 9:28 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/stonewalled-by-the-s-e-
c/#more-49151.
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). FOIA was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on
July 4, 1966 and implemented in 1967. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
President Barack Obama, supra note 1 (describing FOIA as "encourag[ing] account-
ability through transparency").
4 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-537T, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT: REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION CONTINUE TO EVOLVE 1 (2010) , available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0537t.pdf (noting public requests via FOIA have "led to
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assumption that "accountability is in the interest of the government and the
citizenry alike."' Prior to the enactment of FOIA, citizens interested in obtain-
ing government records had the burden of proving a right to access the re-
quested information.' President Barack Obama's recent comments indicate the
Administration's continued interest in the power of FOIA as an effective tool
of the people.'
A report from the General Accounting Office' found that, in 1999 alone, 1.9
million FOIA requests were made to twenty-five federal agencies.' In fiscal
year 2008, government agencies received over 605,000 FOIA requests, result-
ing in the expenditure of $338 million."o The sheer number of requests and
resources expended has led to criticism of the legislation." Nevertheless, many
the disclosure of waste, fraud, abuse, and wrongdoing in the government, as well as the
identification of unsafe consumer products, harmful drugs, and serious health hazards").
5 President Barack Obama, supra note 1; see generally, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 4.
6 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 1 ("Before the act ... an indi-
vidual seeking access to federal records had faced the burden of establishing a right to ex-
amine them. FOIA established a 'right to know' standard for access, instead of a 'need to
know,' and shifted the burden of proof from the individual to the government agency seek-
ing to deny access.").
7 Dating back to Gerald Ford's presidency, newly elected presidents will announce
their interpretation of FOIA. Editorial, Critics Say New Rule Limits Access to Records, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18; see President Barack Obama, supra note I ("[FOIA] should
be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The gov-
ernment should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be
embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of
speculative or abstract fears. . . ."). FOIA has proved to be especially important tool for
writers, journalists, and social commentators, interested in the release of information gath-
ered by federal agencies in the course of investigations, either via the subpoena power or the
threatened use thereof. These documents, ranging from depositions to emails to reports are
"often essential to fleshing out the details of historical or current events" in the eyes of these
writers. See generally, William D. Cohan, supra note 1; see also generally, Editorial, Critics
Say New Rule Limits Access to Records, supra herein (FOIA "is a crucial piece of legisla-
tion for journalists, researchers and investigators trying to get to the truth of how our gov-
ernment operates. . . . The act is crucial for the protection and general education of the pub-
lic.").
The General Accountability Office ("GAO") is the investigative body of Congress.
See About GAO, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited May 14, 2011).
9 Editorial, Critics Say New Rule Limits Access to Records, supra note 7, at Al8 (re-
porting that approximately 82% of FOIA requests were responded to by federal agencies).
1o U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFORMATION POLICY, FOIA Post: Summary of
Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year 2008,
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/2009foiapostl6.htm. Additional statistics may be found
at http://www.foia.gov/.
II Some critics, especially some federal officials, argue "the information act has become
a burden to federal agencies, which sometimes receive requests for documents hundreds or
thousands of pages long." Editorial, Critics Say New Rule Limits Access to Records, supra
note 7, at A 18. The GAO continues to report that there are growing backlogs of FOIA re-
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still insist FOIA is integral to democratic governance.
FOIA does not, however, provide for the disclosure of all agency-held doc-
uments. The law enumerates nine categories of exemptions to disclosure of
requested information." Courts have primarily determined the scope and pro-
tections of these exemptions. 4 Because the vast number of FOIA requests con-
tinues to increase yearly, the scope of these exemptions and the parties pro-
tected under them takes on great significance.
One such exemption-Exemption 7(C)-protects against certain disclosures
of information that would invade personal privacy." Exemption 7(C) to FOIA
expressly protects against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy by pro-
hibiting the disclosure of documents collected during law enforcement investi-
gations." While it is well-settled that Exemption 7(C) applies to individuals, 7
courts had yet to address the issue of corporate protection under 7(C) until
AT&TInc. v. FCC, the case which is the focus of this Note.
In AT&T Inc. v. FCC," AT&T sought to thwart disclosure of certain gov-
quests. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 1-3. In 2007, Congress
attempted to address the issues surrounding FOIA with the passage of the OPEN Govern-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 110-175, amending FOIA to require additional reporting in greater
detail of information on timeliness and backlogged requests in agency annual reports. See
generally, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4.
12 Editorial, Critics Say New Rule Limits Access to Records, supra note 7 (describing
FOIA as "indispensable").
13 FOIA exemptions protect the following information from disclosure: classified in-
formation and national security, internal agency personnel information, information ex-
empted by other statutes, trade secrets and other confidential business information, inter-
and intra-agency memoranda, disclosures that constitute an unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy, information gathered in law enforcement investigations, reports from regulated finan-
cial institutions, and geological and geophysical information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-
(b)(9).
"4 See generally Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information
Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public Interest
in Knowing What the Government's Up To, 11 CoMM. L & PoL'Y 511, 514 (2006) (tracing
"the development of the [Supreme] Court's FOIA-related privacy framework and ex-
amin[ing] how it fits into the law's statutory scheme as devised by Congress").
15 Congress sought to strike a balance between "the individual's right to privacy and the
public's interest in access to government-held information." Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra
note 14, at 513 (noting "at least half of all rejected FOIA requests from 1999 to at least 2003
have been refused on the ground that disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of privacy under either Exemption 6 or Exemption 7(C), according to available Department
of Justice records").
16 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
17 See, e.g. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 764 (1989); Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160
(2004); Davin v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1058 (3d Cir. 1995); Cuccaro v.
Sec'y of Labor, 770 F.2d 355, 359-60 (3rd Cir. 1985).
8 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 562 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011) (No. 09-1279).
'9 Throughout some of the litigation at the focus of this Note, AT&T, Inc. was legally
483
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ernment-held information by asserting a personal privacy interest under Ex-
emption 7(C).20 The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") investi-
gated AT&T, amassing a considerable amount of sensitive documentation re-
garding AT&T, its employees, and its billing practices.2 CompTel22 sought
access to those documents through a FOIA request." In a reverse FOIA suit,24
AT&T attempted to block disclosure by asserting the applicability of several
FOIA exemptions, most notably Exemption 7(C).25 The FCC rejected AT&T's
blanket reliance on Exemption 7(C)." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that AT&T may rely
on Exemption 7(C).27 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari28 and
reversed the Third Circuit, holding that corporations may not assert the Ex-
emption 7(C) personal privacy protection.29
While AT&T focused its position on accepted principles of statutory inter-
pretation, the Court rejected AT&T's position in favor of the FCC's reading of
FOIA and Exemption 7(C).3" However, the opinion noticeably lacked attention
to FOIA's primary purpose-public access to information and government
transparency-and the judiciary's role in interpreting such a statute. Further,
indication of how the Roberts Court will continue to interpret the interplay be-
tween corporate rights and privacy notions remains open to speculation." Be-
known as SBC Communications, Inc. To maintain consistency, this Note will refer to this
entity as AT&T Inc. only.
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part III.
22 CompTel is a Washington, D.C. based industry association of long-distance telephone
providers, local telephone carriers, and their supply partners. See Who We Are, COMPTEL,
http://www.comptel.org/content.asp?contentid=484 (last visited May 14, 2011). AT&T
negatively characterizes CompTel as "a trade association representing AT&T's competitors
with a history of attempting to tarnish AT&T's goodwill and reputation in regulatory pro-
ceedings." Brief for Petitioner at 6, AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 2009) (No.
08-4024), rev'd, 562 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279).
23 See infra Part III.
24 A reverse FOIA suit occurs when an entity seeks to prevent the disclosure of informa-
tion supplied to a government agency through litigation in response to a FOIA request. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, 863
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiaguide09/reverse-foia.pdf. A court will
vacate an agency's disclosure order if the agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
25 See infra Part III.
26 Infra Part II.
27 Infra Part III.C.
28 Infra Part III.D.
29 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
30 Id. at 1185.
31 While some may argue that CompTel was targeting AT&T for consumer and indus-
try-related information, the documents sought by investigators provide a window into the
government's breadth of investigation and are, therefore, relevant to government transpar-
ency. See infra Part III-IV; see also Justin Haddock & So Jung Choo, FCC v. AT&T Inc.
484 [Vol. 19
2011] Corporations Lack Personal Privacy Under FOIA Exemptions
cause several lingering questions persist following the Court's opinion that
could impact significant areas of law outside of AT&T Inc. v. FCC's narrow
facts, this Note further studies the policy implications of FOIA and corporate
rights.
This Note examines the application of FOIA and the Privacy Amendments
based on the recent Supreme Court decision in AT&T Inc. v. FCC.3 2 Part II will
discuss FOIA generally, with specific attention to its statutory language, pur-
pose, and legislative history. Part II of the Note will also detail the develop-
ment of the exemptions, concentrating specifically on Exemption 7(C) as it
applies to individual privacy rights. Part III will offer a substantive analysis of
AT&T Inc. v. FCC, with a review of its procedural posture, the arguments of
both parties before both the Third Circuit and Supreme Court, and the respec-
tive court decisions. Part IV will set forth an analysis of public policy reasons
against expanding Exemption 7(C) to cover corporations that the Supreme
Court neglected to address in its opinion. The Note will conclude by recogniz-
ing several lingering questions left unanswered by the Court's silence with
regard to the case's policy implications.
II. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT & PRIVACY
AMENDMENTS CREATING FOIA EXEMPTIONS
A. The Freedom of Information Act
Federal administrative and regulatory agencies" collect and produce a wide
variety of information.34 The Freedom of Information Act is based on the sim-
(09-1279), CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/09-1279 (last visited May 14, 2011) (describing the
scope of the case as "determin[ing] the amount of protection given to corporations under
FOIA and will likely affect the amount of access the public has to certain private corporate
information").
32 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1185.
33 FOIA provides for the disclosure of documentation held by only government offices
categorized as an "agency," which includes any "executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the
executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or
any independent regulatory agency." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). Accordingly, many govem-
ment entities, notably Congress, the federal courts, private corporations or federally funded
state agencies, are not subject to FOIA. Id.
34 See generally, Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 512 (sum-
marizing the variety of information stored by the government to include "FBI records on
organized-crime figures, census statistics revealing zip codes with the highest per capita
household incomes in the nation, and Environmental Protection Agency recommendations
for developing U.S. energy policy") (internal citations omitted).
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pie premise that democratic governments must remain accountable to their cit-
izens through the disclosure of information." To further this purpose, FOIA
"provide[s] access to only those records that directly shed light on official
agency activities and performance." Prior to FOIA's passage, public access
was available only for documents that agencies voluntarily disclosed."
FOIA" allows public access to such information via two avenues: (1) af-
firmative agency disclosure" and (2) public requests for disclosure.4 0 In a pub-
lic request scenario, FOIA prescribes certain time deadlines for agencies to
respond and make determinations regarding disclosures.4 If the disclosure re-
quest is denied, a FOIA requester may attempt to compel disclosure.42 Addi-
tionally, FOIA requires agencies to prepare annual reports detailing requests
3 See generally, Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (disclosure, not
secrecy, is the dominant objective of FOIA); CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF
THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 89-813, 89th Cong. 1st
Sess., at 10 (1965) ("[G]ovemment by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks
to serve; it injures its own integrity and operation. It breeds mistrust, dampens the fervor of
its citizens, and mocks their loyalty."); CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE
PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1966); accord Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978); see also
generally, David Carr, THE MEDIA EQUATION: Let The Sun Shine, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2007, at Cl (characterizing FOIA as holding "that information gathered on our behalf-paid
for and owned by you and me, at least theoretically-should be ours for the asking"); Chrys-
ler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-294 (1979) (noting "FOIA is exclusively a disclosure
statute" and even if an exemption applies, the agency still has discretion to disclose).
36 Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 514 (citing Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 772-74).
n Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552) (describing FOIA as an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act
to "to clarify and protect the right of the public to information"); Reporters Comm. for
Freedom ofPress, 489 U.S. at 754.
38 The FOIA was enacted in 1966 as an amendment to the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et. seq. (2006). See generally FOIA Legislative History, The National
Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/nsalfoialeghistoryllegistfoia.htm (provid-
ing links and overview of the legislative history and presidential signing orders for FOIA
and all its various amendments dating from FOIA's passage to the present)[hereinafter
FOIA Legislative History, The National Security Archive].
39 5. U.S.C. § 552(a)(2); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at
1-2 (defining affirmative agency disclosure as "publishing information in the Federal Regis-
ter or the Internet, or making it available in reading rooms").
40 5. U.S.C. § 553(a)(3)(A); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4,
at 1-2 (defining a public request as "any member of the public may request access to infor-
mation held by federal agencies, without showing a need or reason for seeking the informa-
tion").
41 An agency typically has 20 business days to respond once a FOIA request has been
filed. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A); see generally, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 4, at 2; see William D. Cohan, supra note 1.
42 A FOIA requester may sue for disclosure in district courts under 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B), or under (6)(C) if the agency does not respond to the request within the period
of time specified by FOIA.
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and response times.43 Beginning in 2005, individual agencies were required to
appoint Chief FOIA Officers to coordinate FOIA programs, create FOIA Re-
quester Service Centers, and monitor FOIA Public Liaisons to improve FOIA
compliance."
Pursuant to FOIA, "upon any request for records which (i) reasonably
describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stat-
ing the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed," an agency
"shall make the records promptly available to any person." 45 FOIA defines
"person" as "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or
private organization other than an agency." 46 However, such disclosure may
not occur where a mandatory statutory exemption governs.47
B. The Creation of the FOIA Exemptions
In 1974, Congress created FOIA Exemptions to protect from unwarranted
invasions of personal privacy 48 through requested government disclosure. 49 The
Supreme Court has previously noted that FOIA Exemptions protect "important
interests"o and "are intended to have meaningful reach and application.""
Therefore, in situations where a statutory exemption governs, disclosure is not
required.52 The requester "must show that the public interest sought to be ad-
vanced is a significant one."" If the requested records fall under one of the
FOIA Exemptions, the agency must "weigh the policy considerations favoring
non-disclosure against the reasons cited for permitting inspection."54 FOIA
43 These reports are available at www.usdoj.gov/oip/04 6.html and additional informa-
tion may be found at www.foia.gov. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(1) (requiring agencies to submit
a report by February 1 yearly to the Attorney General detailing the number of requests re-
ceived, number of requests still pending, and other information regarding the preceding
year).
4 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Exec. Order No.
13,392, Improving Agency Disclosure ofInformation (Washington, D.C., Dec. 14, 2005)).
45 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
46 5 U.S.C. § 551(2).
47 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
48 "Personal privacy" appears in FOIA Exemptions 4, 6, and 7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4),
(6), (7). In 1974, Congress created Exemption 7(C). See FOIA Legislative History, The
National Security Archive, supra note 38.
49 See generally FOIA Legislative History, The National Security Archive, supra note
38 (summarizing the historical context and actions of various Presidents and Congress while
drafting, passing, and amending FOIA).
50 Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1982).
51 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1989).
52 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); see U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 181 (1993) (ex-
plaining that FOIA exemptions are to be construed "narrowly in favor of disclosure").
s3 Natl'Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.
54 47 C.F.R. § 0.457 (2009).
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does not prevent the disclosure of documents falling within its exemptions;
rather, individual agency regulations prevent the disclosure of those documents
from that agency."s
At issue in AT&T Inc. v. FCC, Exemption 7 concerns documents collected
for investigative purposes." Exemption 7(C) prohibits from disclosure:
Records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . (C) could rea-
sonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
Exemption 7(C) also applies to records "compiled for civil enforcement pur-
poses."" While it is well-settled that FOIA Exemptions apply to individuals,"
Exemption 7(C) does not define "personal privacy."
In drafting 7(C), Congress utilized the language of Exemption 6.60 Both the
Senate and House Reports reflect an interest in protecting individual privacy
interests with the passage of Exemption 7(C).6" Originally, courts found that
Exemption 7 did not require the government to articulate an "identifiable
5s The Third Circuit noted, "FOIA itself does not prohibit disclosure of information
falling within its exemptions. When information falls within an exemption, no party can
compel disclosure, but the FCC can still make a disclosure on its own accord unless some
independent source of law prohibits the agency from doing so. . . . Thus, the disclosure of
information falling within an exemption does not violate FOIA itself, but rather an inde-
pendent source of law. Here, FCC regulations provide this independent source." AT&T Inc.
v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 495 n. 2 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 293; 47 C.F.R. §
0.457(g)(3)).
56 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D).
5 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
58 Rugiero v. U. S. Dep't of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Tax
Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
5 See generally Charlie Savage, Judges Divided Over Rising GPS Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at A12 (briefly discussing Supreme Court interpretation that criminal
rap sheets, even when "each offense was separately listed in public documents scattered
through decades of courthouse files," are protected from disclosure under FOIA exemp-
tions). One court has even taken the aggressive stance of extending protection to an animal.
David Carr, supra note 35, at Cl (briefly describing 2002 denial of FOIA request for medi-
cal records of Ryma, the giraffe from the National Zoo, because "the release would violate
the animal's privacy rights").
60 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)-(7); see U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
510 U.S. 487, 496 (1994) (noting that Exemptions 6 and 7 only differ to the extent that the
public interest has to outweigh the privacy interests involved).
61 CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 35, at 9 ("'clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy' enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the
protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny and the preser-
vation of the public's right to governmental information"); CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING
THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 35, at 11
(noting that using the limiting phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion" strikes "a proper bal-
ance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy" with "the preservation of the
public's right to Government information" through the exclusion of documents, of which
disclosure could harm individuals).
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harm" when it denied access to law enforcement records.62
Congress amended Exemption 7 in 1974 to clarify its scope: "law enforce-
ment records were only exempt when disclosure would interfere with certain
enumerated interests." 6 Senator Hart articulated the need for such narrowing
of the original Exemption 7:
Our concern is that, under the interpretation by the courts in recent cases, the seventh
exemption will deny public access to information even previously available. For ex-
ample, we fear that such information as meat inspection reports, civil right compliance
information, and Medicare nursing home reports will be considered exempt under the
seventh exemption.
Case law also reveals that Congress was particularly concerned with per-
sonal privacy rights when it passed the Exemptions. In Washington Post Co. v.
Department ofJustice, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
held that Exemption 7(C) does not prevent the disclosure of documents that
concern "business judgments and relationships."" Furthermore, the D.C. Cir-
cuit has rejected corporate protection under Exemption 6.6
More recently, the D.C. Circuit found that only the personal privacy of indi-
viduals invoked the protections of Exemption 6. In Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S.
Food and Drug Administration" ("FDA"), the FDA refused to disclose the
names and contact information of "private individuals and companies" that had
been involved in the approval of a morning-after abortion drug, in the hopes of
preventing "abortion-related violence."6 ' The D.C. Circuit affirmed the FDA's
application of Exemption 6 and found a valid individual privacy interest in
62 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Public Citizen et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 4, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. - 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279) (cit-
ing Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370,
372 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Since these files are 'investigatory files compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes,' our duty is 'at an end.'
63 Id.
64 120 CONG. REc. S17,033 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in House Com-
mittee on Government Operations, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.; Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari for Public Citizen et al., supra note 62, at 5 ("Congress determined
that disclosure of investigative records concerning various corporate activities was central to
the functioning of FOIA as a disclosure statute and amended Exemption 7 specifically to
ensure public access to such records").
65 863 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Washington Post requested records from the Food
and Drug Administration regarding an investigation of Eli Lilly Company's failure to dis-
close side effects from a drug. Eli Lilly Company asserted Exemption 7(C) to prevent dis-
closure. In rejecting their claim, the D.C. Circuit clarified Exemption 7(C): "the disclosures
with which the statute is concerned are those of 'an intimate personal nature' such as marital
status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical condition, welfare
payments, alcoholic consumption, family fights, and reputation." Id. at 100.
66 Id. at 100 (citing Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 573-74 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
67 449 F.3d 141, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
68 Id. at 153.
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preventing "physical danger." 9 The court noted "the private interest in-
volved-'namely, the individual's right to privacy'-and conclud[ed] that the
'private interest in avoiding harassment or violence tilts the scales' " in favor
of nondisclosure."o Previous D.C. Circuit opinions have drawn similar distinc-
tions between individual and corporate ability to invoke Exemption 6."
1II. A CLOSER LOOK AT AT&TINC. V. FCC72
A. Factual Background
AT&T Inc. v. FCC arose out of a dispute over the FCC's "E-Rate" program,
which seeks to increase the availability of advanced telecommunications tech-
nology in elementary and secondary schools." Under the "E-rate" program,
telecommunications companies, including AT&T, receive govemment reim-
bursement in exchange for supplying equipment and services.74
In August 2004, AT&T found that Southern New England Telephone Com-
pany" improperly billed the federal Universal Service Fund Administrative
Company" for equipment and services provided to the New London, Con-
69 Id.(citing Lepelletier v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 164 F.3d 37, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
70 Reply Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners at 7, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562
U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279) (citing Judicial Watch, Inc., 449 F.3d at
153).
71 See, e.g., Multi AG Media LLC v. Dep't of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (noting "businesses themselves do not have protected privacy interests under Exemp-
tion 6"); see also Simms v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 572 n. 47 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing "Ex-
emption 6 is applicable only to individuals"); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleepe,
547 F.2d 673, 685 n. 44 (stating "the sixth exemption has not been extended to protect the
privacy interests of businesses or corporations").
72 AT& T v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 490. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has now
granted certiorari making the case name, FCC v. AT&T, Inc., this Note refers to the case as
"AT&T Inc. v. FCC" throughout for the purpose of clarity and consistency.
73 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.500-54.523; Second Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, 18
F.C.C.R. 9202, ff 1-90 (2003) (describing the E-Rate program); see also generally, AT&T
Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 492 (briefly describing the purpose of "E-Rate" program and
AT&T's participation).
74 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 492.
75 Southern New England Telephone Company is AT&T's Connecticut subsidiary.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 4.
76 An independent corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company oversees
the Universal Service Fund. The FCC created the fund to finance federal telecommunica-
tions programs geared towards providing services to rural areas, low-income customers,
health care providers, and education providers. See Overview, UNIVERSAL SERVICE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE COMPANY, http://www.universalservice.org/fund-administration/ (last visited May
14, 2011).
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necticut school district.7 AT&T voluntarily and confidentially reported the
overbilling of the New London project to the FCC, refunded all payments
from the improper billing, and canceled any outstanding invoices that may
have been improperly billed."
The Enforcement Bureau of the FCCs0 investigated the matter and required
AT&T to provide extensive amount of documentation relevant to the New
London project, including: invoices, internal e-mails with sensitive pricing and
billing information, responses to FCC Enforcement Bureau interrogatories,
names of employees involved in the allegedly improper billing, and AT&T's
own assessment of whether and to what extent AT&T employees violated its
internal code of conduct."
Following the investigation, the matter was settled by consent decree, in
which AT&T agreed to pay the FCC $500,000 but admitted no wrongdoing.82
B. Responding to FOIA Request, the FCC Finds Disclosure Appropriate
In October 2006, CompTel requested FOIA disclosure of "all pleadings
and correspondence contained in" the FCC's investigation of AT&T's alleged
overcharges to the "E-rate" program.84 In opposition to CompTel's request,
AT&T filed a letter with the FCC, asserting a personal privacy interest pro-
tected by FOLA Exemptions." Specifically, AT&T argued against disclosure
7 Id. at 4; see also AT&T Inc. v FCC, 582 F.3d at 492 ("In August 2004, AT&T dis-
covered that it might have overcharged the Government for certain work done for the New
London, Connecticut school district."); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 3, n. 3 ("The
universal service fund administrator is an independent, not-for-profit corporation that ad-
ministers the federal universal service fund on behalf the FCC.") .
78 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 492.
7 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 4.
80 The FCC's Enforcement Bureau enforces the Communications Act and FCC rules,
terms and conditions of station authorizations. Enforcement Bureau, FED. COMMC'NS
COMM'N., http://www.fcc.gov/eb/ (last visited May 14, 2011).
8' Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 5.
82 See in re SBC Communications Inc., Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 24,014 (Dec. 14, 2004); see
also, AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 492 ("The two sides ultimately resolved the matter via
a consent decree.").
83 CompTel subsequently filed a FOIA suit in United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. This suit was stayed pending the resolution of AT&T Inc. v. FCC. See
generally, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22 at 2-3.
84 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 493 (briefly describing CompTel's Apr 4, 2005 FOIA
request); Brief for Petitioner supra note 22, at 6 (AT&T suggests that CompTel has "long
sought to use FCC investigations to portray AT&T as lawless or worse." CompTel did not
identify why it sought this information.).
85 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 493 ("AT&T submitted a letter to the [FCC En-
forcement Bureau] opposing CompTel's request, arguing that the FCC collected the docu-
ments that AT&T produced for law enforcement purposes and therefore that the FCC regu-
lations implementing FOIA's exemptions prohibited disclosure.").
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because the investigation files contained internal documents subject to Exemp-
tions 486 and 7(C)." CompTel disputed the applicability of Exemption 7(C)."
In an August 5, 2005 letter opinion, the Enforcement Bureau dismissed
AT&T's blanket assertion of Exemption 7(C) to FOIA production require-
ments. 9 However, the Bureau did invoke Exemptions 6 and 7 in redacting cer-
tain information in AT&T's documents.90 Moreover, the Bureau found that
some of the documents were protected under "FOIA's deliberative-privilege
exemption."" CompTel appealed the FCC's application of Exemption 4 and
5.92
AT&T appealed to the FCC, primarily challenging the Bureau's decision
that Exemption 7(C) was inapplicable to corporations.93 AT&T emphasized
that Exemption 7(C) protected entities "who had been the subject of law en-
forcement proceedings from embarrassment, reprisal or harassment . . . associ-
ated with [such] investigations." 94 AT&T asserted that it had "concrete privacy
interests" in the documents, which were originally not intended to be available
to the general public." AT&T emphasized that the FCC obtained these docu-
ments "only through the happenstance of a law-enforcement investigation,"
which was initiated by AT&T's voluntary efforts to correct the improper bill-
ing." Further, AT&T maintained that the documents were not of public interest
86 The FCC Enforcement Bureau "found that portions of AT&T's documents-such as
documents revealing AT&T's 'pricing information'-were exempt from disclosure under
FOIA Exemption 4." Brief for Petitioner supra note 22, at 8 n. 4. FOIA Exemption 4 pro-
vides: Matters relating to "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
87 Brief for Petitioner supra note 22, at 2; see also id. at 7 ("AT&T explained that the
internal documents that AT&T had produced to the Bureau had been 'compiled for law
enforcement purposes' and were protected from disclosure under the FOIA's law enforce-
ment exemption (Exemption 7(C) and FCC rules implementing that exemption.") (internal
citations omitted).
88 See AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 497.
89 Id. at 493 ("That exemption, the [FCC Enforcement Bureau] held, does not apply to
corporations because corporations lack 'personal privacy.' ").
90 Pursuant to Exemption 4 and 7(C), the FCC redacted pricing information and infor-
mation identifying AT&T employees and customers, while finding disclosure appropriate
for the remaining information. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22 at 8 n. 4. However, the
Bureau did not apply Exemption 7(C) to the corporation as a whole, finding that such enti-
ties do not possess the requisite personal privacy interests under Exemption 7(C). Id.
91 Id.
92 Brief for Petitioner supra note 22, at 9 n. 5. FOIA Exemption 5 provides: "Inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency" are exempt from FOIA disclosure.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
93 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 493 ("AT&T filed an application requesting the FCC
to review the [FCC Enforcement Bureau]'s ruling"); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 2.
94 Brief for Petitioner supra note 22, at 8.
95 Id. at 9.
96 Id.
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because "they included no information about the Government that would shed
any light on governmental activities."97 In a September 12, 2008 order, the
FCC rejected any Exemption 7(C) arguments" and mandated disclosure."
In considering the merits of AT&T's appeal, the FCC determined that cor-
porations lack the requisite personal privacy to invoke Exemption 7(C).0o' The
FCC relied heavily on Washington Post Co v. United States Department of
Justice,"o' which the FCC read as establishing that Exemption 7(C) applies
"exclusively [to] interests of an 'intimate personal nature.' "102 The Commis-
sion further rejected AT&T's assertion that Exemption 7(C) protects corpora-
tions from "embarrassment" and "the possibility of harassment" in law en-
forcement investigations, noting that corporations' business interests differ
from those of an individual."' Specifically, the FCC read Exemption 7(C) as
protecting "key players in an investigation-targets, witnesses, and law en-
forcement officers" from "literal embarrassment and danger," rather than a
"more abstract impact" on a corporation.' Further, the FCC refused to apply
precedent from other contexts to support corporate privacy interests. Specifi-
cally, the FCC reasoned that corporate interests in Fourth Amendment search
and seizure and civil procedure discovery regime do not control the determina-
tion of a corporate privacy interest under Exemption 7(C).' 5 Ultimately, the
FCC concluded Exemption 7(C) was inapplicable to corporations and, accord-
ingly, denied AT&T's application for review.'06
97 Id. (citing Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 749).
98 In re SBC Communications Inc., On Request For Confidential Treatment, 23
F.C.C.R. 13,704 (2008); AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 493.
99 The FCC's Order mandated disclosure unless AT&T requested a judicial stay by
September 26, 2008. On September 23, AT&T sought a stay from the FCC. Because the
FCC failed to act on the stay, AT&T filed a petition for review and a motion for stay with
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 11.
100 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 493 (stating that "[the FCC] determined that FCC
precedent supports [the view that a corporation lacks 'personal privacy' under Exemption
7(C)] ... as does judicial precedent") (internal citations omitted).
1o 863 F.2d at 96.
102 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 10.
103 Id.
104 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 493 (The FCC found its interpretation of FOIA Ex-
emption 7(C) aligns with the exemption's purpose of protection persons involved in an in-
vestigation.).
1os Id. (FCC found that corporate privacy interests in other contexts, including Fourth
Amendment and discovery in civil suits, does not apply to Exemption 7(C)); see also Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 10-11.
106 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22 at 11.
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C. The Third Circuit Reverses & Remands in Favor of AT&T, Finding
Exemption 7(C) Applies to Corporations
AT&T petitioned for review of the FCC order'o' to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit on September 26, 2008.0' On October 10,
2008, CompTel intervened in the suit.'"
AT&T Inc. v. FCC presented the Third Circuit with four issues to decide: (1)
whether the Third Circuit"' has subject matter jurisdiction to review a FOIA
order of the FCC;' (2) whether AT&T failed to comply with FCC procedure
when filing its application for review of the FCC order;"l2 (3) whether the FCC
misinterpreted Exemption 7(C) of FOIA when it found a corporation lacks
"personal privacy" protection;"'3 and (4) whether the disclosure of AT&T's
documents pursuant to the FOIA request would be an invasion of personal pri-
vacy that rises to the level of "unwarranted" under Exemption 7(C)."4 Ulti-
mately, the most significant issue presented was whether FOIA Exemption
7(C), which prohibits unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, extends to
corporate entities.
The Third Circuit recognized that FOIA mandates the disclosure of particu-
107 In re SBC Communications Inc. On Request for Confidential Treatment, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,704 (Sept. 9, 2008).
108 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 11 ("In seeking a stay, AT&T explained that its
petition for review was likely to succeed on the merits because, properly construed, Exemp-
tion 7(C) protects corporate, as well as individual, privacy interests."); see also id. at 12.
Presently, disclosure of the documents requested in the original FOIA request by CompTel
is stayed until the outcome of the case is resolved. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 494.
109 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 490, 494.
110 The Third Circuit disagreed with CompTel's assertion that federal district courts, not
appellate circuits had subject matter jurisdiction. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 at 495 n. 3 (find-
ing that none of the cases cited are determinative of jurisdiction).
' The Third Circuit concluded it had appellate jurisdiction over the review of FCC
orders made pursuant to the Communications Act under 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) and 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(a). Id. at 494. The Third Circuit noted, "courts have consistently held that an order
adjudicating an alleged violation of FCC regulations is an order 'under' the Communica-
tions Act within the meaning of § 402(a)." Id. (citing Rocky Mountain Radar, Inc. v. FCC,
158 F.3d 1118, 1119, 1121-23 (10th Cir. 1998) (order finding company violated FCC regu-
lations is an order "under" the Communications Act); Maier v. FCC, 735 F.2d 220, 224 (7th
Cir. 1984) (order finding company did not violate FCC regulations is an order "under" the
Communications Act)). The Court determined that the FCC order mandating the disclosure
of AT&T documents relating to the New London project was an order within the meaning
of 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); thereby, under 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1), the Third Circuit has appellate
jurisdiction over the FCC order at issue. Id. at 494-495.
112 The Court rejected the FCC's argument that AT&T failed to comply with FCC pro-
cedural requirements in filing its application for review of the FCC order. AT&T Inc. v.
FCC, 582 F.3d at 495 (recognizing AT&T's procedural default was not an independent
ground supporting the FCC's decision" as the FCC, regardless of the default, considered the
petition's merits).
"3 Id. at 496.
114 Id at 498-99.
494 [Vol. 19
2011] Corporations Lack Personal Privacy Under FOIA Exemptions
lar documents in an agency's possession,"' exempts certain law enforcement
investigation documents as a personal privacy right,"' and defines the term
"person.""' While it agreed that individuals may assert this personal privacy
right,"' the court recognized that it must "determine whether corporations"
may also assert this right."' AT&T contended that FCC disclosure of the in-
vestigation documents would unlawfully invade AT&T's personal privacy,'20
while the FCC asserted that corporations are devoid of personal privacy and
cannot prevent disclosure on such grounds.'2'
The Third Circuit agreed with AT&T's reading of Exemption 7(C).'22 The
court noted that the FCC's interpretation of Exemption 7(C) was not entitled to
deference,' and that courts must reverse FCC decisions that are "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."'24 The court then described the purpose and goals of FOIA and its ex-
emptions,'25 explaining that Exemption 7(C) protects solely against disclosures
that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy."l26 The court found it persuasive that while FOIA fails to
define "personal," the statute does define "person" to "include[] an individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other
"s Id. at 492 (FOIA "requires a federal agency to disclose certain documents within its
possession"); 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1)-(3).
116 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 492 ("FOIA exempts from mandatory disclosure
'records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information . .. could reasonably be ex-
pected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy") (ellipsis in original).
117 Id. ("[FOIA] defines 'person' to 'include an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or public or private organization other than an agency"'); see also 5 U.S.C. §
551(2).
118 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 496 ("Human beings have such 'personal privacy."').
"9 Id. at 492.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 496.
123 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 496 (finding that, because FOIA is government-wide
and no agency in particular enforces it, the FCC order at issue was not entitled deference
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 104 S. Ct.
2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)) (citing ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir.
2008) for "declining to accord deference to Department of Defense interpretation of
FOIA").
124 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
125 Id. (describing briefly the legislative purpose and goals of FOIA and personal privacy
exemptions). With its 1966 passage of FOLA, Congress hoped "to improve public access to
information controlled by federal agencies." Id. FOIA embraces "a philosophy of full dis-
closure: an agency may deny a reasonable request for information only if the information
falls into a statutorily delineated exemption." Id. (citing OSHA Data/ClH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't
of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) for its description of Congress's intent when
passing FOlA).
126 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 496 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)).
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than an agency."27
The court then turned to the issue of whether a corporation has a personal
privacy interest, noting that "[njeither the Supreme Court nor this [c]ourt has
ever squarely rejected a proffered personal privacy interest of a corporation."' 28
The court first examined the plain language of FOIA.'"9 AT&T presented a
plain meaning reading of Exemption 7(C), urging that the court apply the ex-
emption to corporations.'" The Third Circuit concluded that AT&T correctly
read FOIA and Exemption 7(C) as unambiguous as to the meaning of "per-
sonal privacy" because the statute explicitly defines "person." 3'
The court also found it persuasive that some FOIA exemptions expressly in-
dicate that they apply only to individuals.'32 For example, Exemption 7(F)
"protects information gathered pursuant to a law enforcement investigation
that, if released, 'could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical
safety of any individual.' "'" In contrast, such limiting language is noticeably
absent from Exemption 7(C), which only uses the phrase "personal privacy." 34
The court rejected the FCC's and CompTel's "text-based arguments" as "un-
convincing"13' because they "fail[ed] to take into account that 'person'-the
root from which the statutory word at issue is derived-is a defined term."'
Similarly, the court rejected the FCC and CompTel's "flawed" argument
that the limited scope of Exemption 6 controls the scope of Exemption 7(C)."'
The court stated that, even if Exemption 6 applies only to individuals, "this
does not mean that each and every component phrase in that exemption, taken
on its own, limits Exemption 6 to individuals."' Exemption 6 applies only to
127 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(2)).
128 Id.
129 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 496-97 (stating that the plain meaning rule will be
utilized to interpret the FOIA exemption at issue) (citing Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S.
424, 429-40 (1981)) (ellipsis in original).
130 Id. at 497 ("AT&T argues that the plain text of Exemption 7(C) indicates that it ap-
plies to corporations. After all, 'personal' is the adjectival form of 'person,' and FOIA de-
fines 'person' to include a corporation.").
'3' Id. (finding that Exemption 7(C) personal privacy protection applies to corporations
because FOIA defines "person" to include a corporation and "personal" is merely the adjec-
tival form of that defined term).
132 Id (noting Congress was aware that any desire to apply the FOIA statute to human
beings must be made clear with express language).
133 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F)) (emphasis added by the court).
134 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 497.
135 Id ("The FCC and CompTel's text-based arguments to the contrary are unconvinc-
ing.").
136 Id (citing Biskupski v. Att'y Gen., 503 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) ("If, as here, 'a
statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from
that term's ordinary meaning."')).
137 Id
138 Id at 497 (emphasis in original).
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individuals because the Exemption protects "personnel and medical files,"
which can only belong to individuals.'"9 Therefore, Exemption 6 does not ade-
quately provide insight into the scope of the larger concept of "personal pri-
vacy."140 Accordingly, the court found that the language of Exemption 7(C)
unambiguously includes corporate personal privacy rights.14' The court con-
cluded its analysis without further considering FOIA's statutory purpose,142
relevant, non-binding case law,143 and legislative history.'"
Following its finding that a corporation could assert Exemption 7(C) per-
sonal privacy protection, the court turned to the question of whether "as a mat-
ter of law, the invasion of personal privacy caused by the release of the docu-
ments [AT&T] submitted to the FCC could reasonably be expected to be 'un-
warranted' within the meaning of Exemption 7(C)."'45 The court disagreed
with AT&T's argument.146 In "abid[ing] by the long-established principles of
administrative law," 47 the court remanded the case to the FCC for further pro-
ceedings.148
D. The Supreme Court Grants Cert to Review Scope of Exemption 7(C)
On September 28, 2010, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider whether FOIA Exemption 7(C) applies to corporations, as the
Third Circuit had found.149
1. The Government and CompTel Advocate Reversing the Third Circuit
The Government argued that Exemption 7(C) does not include protection for
corporate personal privacy.'o Primarily citing National Archives & Records
139 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 497.
140 Id. (rejecting the use of Exemption 6 language to help determine the scope of "per-
sonal privacy" in Exemption 7(C)).
141 Id. at 498.
142 Id.
143 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 498.
'4 Id.
145 Id. at 498-499.
146 Id at 499.
147 Id. ("[U]nder settled principles of administrative law, when a court reviewing agency
action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court's inquiry is at an end: the
case must be remanded to the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal
standards.").
1 AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d at 499-500.
149 Id. at 490.
150 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 22, at 34 (noting "unanimity among courts and
commentators" that Exemption 7(C) applies only to individuals").
497
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Admin. v. Favish,"' the Government argued three reasons that the Court should
not expand the scope of Exemption 7(C) to include corporations.
First, if Exemption 7(C) applies to corporations it will-by extension-
apply to state, local, and foreign governments.'52 Federal agencies collecting
documentation on state, local, and foreign governments would be allowed to
withhold such information from requesters, an act that would contradict the
very purpose of FOTA as a means for government transparency.' Such new
protection will force agencies to "attempt to balance previously non-existent
'personal privacy' interests of business and governmental entities against the
public interest in disclosure to determine whether releasing agency records
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of such 'privacy' under Exemption
7(C)." 54
Second, reading Exemption 7(C) to include corporations lacks support in
FOIA's text or previous judicial precedent. 55 The Third Circuit's decision
"disregards basic tenets of statutory construction," creating "significant tension
with the D.C. Circuit's long standing interpretation of FOIA's privacy exemp-
tions."' The Government pointed to a number of sources to support its narrow
interpretation of "personal privacy" in Exemption 7(C).'" The Government
maintained that the meaning of the phrase "turns on the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole."' The Government argued that "personal" refers "most
naturally" to individuals.' Because "personal privacy" appears only as a
joined term in Exemption 7(C), the phrase applies only to individuals.'" Fur-
thermore, the Third Circuit failed to articulate how the privacy experiences of a
'5' 541 U.S. at 166 ("Congress gave special attention to the language in Exemption
7(C)"); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 34-35.
152 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners at 13, 24-25, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562
U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279).
'sM3 Id.
154 Id. at 13; see also id. at 25 (summarizing concerns regarding "personification" of
corporations).
1ss Id. at 13 ("The court of appeals' decision finds no support in FOIA's text or any judi-
cial decision construing Exemption 7(C) in the 35 years since its enactment.").
156 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152 at 13.
15 Id.
158 Id. at 14 (citing Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2009)).
159 Id. at 14-15 ("Dictionaries reflect that 'personal' normally means 'of or relating to a
particular person' and 'affecting one individual or each of many individuals,' 'relating to an
individual,' or 'relating to or characteristic of human beings as distinct from things.' ") (cit-
ing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1966)).
160 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152, at 15 ("The law ordi-
narily protects personal privacy to safeguard human dignity and preserve individual auton-
omy. . . . Such concepts do not comfortably extend to a corporation, which 'exists only in
contemplation of law' as 'an artificial being, invisible, and intangible.' ") (internal citations
omitted).
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corporation and individual are "analogous," noting an "attempted personifica-
tion of an entity whose very existence is a legal construct."'' Similarly, the
Government pointed to the fact that, in the context of tort law or Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, corporations do not enjoy the benefits of personal
privacy.162
The Government maintained that "Congress specifically modeled Exemp-
tion 7(C) on Exemption 6 . . . which itself protects only the privacy interests of
individuals."' When Congress reproduced the exact same language from Ex-
emption 6 to 7(C), it intended the same meaning to the phrase.'" Further, the
Government noted the "leading" administrative law treatise at the time of the
creation of the exemptions held a corporation could not invoke Exemption 6
protection "because the phrase 'personal privacy' always relates to individu-
als."' The Government pointed to a line of case law supporting this conten-
tion'6 ' and Attorney General Edward Levi's interpretative memorandum issued
immediately after Exemption 7(C)'s enactment.'6 ' The case law originating
from the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit further supports
the conclusion that Exemption 7(C) only applies to individuals.' 8 Moreover,
Exemption 7 protection for corporations is not necessary, as significant protec-
tions already explicitly exist in Exemption 4.6
161 Id. at 25.
162 Id. at 15-16.
163 Id. at 16 ("identical phrases within the same statute should normally be given the
same meaning") (citing Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232
(2007)).
64 Id. (noting that Congress utilized the language of Exemption 6 in enacting 7(C) "to
protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary
disclosure of personal information") (citing 120 Cong. Rec. at S 17,033 (daily ed. May 30,
1974) (statement of Sen. Hart) and Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595,
599 (1982)).
165 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152, at 17.
'6 Id. at 18 (citing Wine Hobby USA Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 n.12 (3d Cir. 1974);
Rural Housing Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 73, 77 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Getman v. Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd., 450 F.2d 670, 674 & n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Rose v. Dep't of the Air
Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974); Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541
U.S. 157, 169 (2004) (Courts "can assume that Congress legislated against this background
of law, scholarship, and history ... when it amended Exemption 7(C)")).
167 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 AMEND-
MENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 9 (1975) ("[T]he phrase 'personal privacy'
pertains to the privacy interests of individuals" and "does not seem applicable to corpora-
tions or other entities."); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152, at
18.
168 Multi AG Media LCC v. USDA, 515 F.3d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Sims v. CIA,
642 F.2d 562, 572 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547
F.2d 673, 685 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Washington Post Co., 863 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
169 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152, at 22 ("[c]orporations
have a legitimate interest in preserving the secrecy of certain information, and Congress
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The Government further took issue with the Third Circuit's line of reasoning
in the decision below.' The Government argued that, while "person" is a de-
fined term in FOIA, the linguistic relationship between "person" and "per-
sonal" does not support the use of the definition of person for "personal pri-
vacy.""' Instead, the statutory context determines the meaning of a statutory
term.172 The Government criticized the Third Circuit's distinction between Ex-
emptions 6 and 7(C) as inappropriate, arguing that the distinction should not
"turn upon the label of the file.""'
Finally, the Government noted that this interpretation is counter to appropri-
ate FOIA procedure,'74 which agencies have followed since the legislation's
inception."' The Government criticized the Third Circuit's opinion as ignoring
both the "the context of FOIA's exemptions," as well as the "lengthy history
behind Exemption 6 and 7(C).""16 The Government further stated the Third
Circuit failed to provide any persuasive "textual rationale for its holding."'77 In
doing so, the Third Circuit's decision made an "unprecedented departure from
35 years of uniform FOIA jurisprudence and commentary." 7 1 Claiming that
this ruling "threaten[ed] significant adverse consequences," the Government
argued that the Third Circuit opinion disturbed well-settled policy on govern-
ment response to thousands of FOIA requests.' Recognizing corporate per-
addressed the need to do so through a specific, circumscribed exemption[, Exemption 4]").
170 Id. at 22-27 ("[t]hat analysis, which led the court to conclude that 'FOIA's text un-
ambiguously' shows that corporations possess 'personal privacy' does not withstand scru-
tiny") (internal citations omitted).
171 Id. at 23 ("[t]he linguistic relationship between the words 'person' and 'personal' -
i.e., that the former is the 'root' of the latter - cannot itself support the Third Circuit's hold-
ing") (internal citations omitted).
172 Id. at 24 ("[t]he phrase 'personal privacy' must be understood as a textual unit") (cit-
ing Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. United Auto. Workers, 523 U.S. 653,
657 (1998)).
17 Id. at 26 (While "the disclosure of personnel and medical files may reveal informa-
tion about corporations and their internal affairs as well as about individuals . . . both Ex-
emptions 6 and 7(C) protect only individuals because each includes the same term - 'per-
sonal privacy' - imposing that limitation") (citing U.S. Dept. of State v. Washington Post
Co., 456 U.S. 595, 601-02 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
'74 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152, at 13-14 ("Federal
agencies have for decades processed FOIA requests under the previously settled understand-
ing that corporations and other non-human entities have no interest in 'personal privacy'
protected by FOIA. . . . The court's ruling, if allowed to stand, also threatens to impose bar-
riers to the public disclosure of government records concerning corporate malfeasance in
government programs that the public has a right to review.").
175 Id. at 13 (arguing the Third Circuit's decision "threatens to revolutionize the manner
in which the federal government must process hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests each
year").
176 Id. at 27.
'77 Id.
178 Id.
1' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152, at 27-28 (In finding
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sonal privacy would "result in the withholding of agency records to which the
public should have access, including records documenting corporate malfea-
sance" and would increase the burden on agencies to respond to FOIA requests
and litigation.'" Moreover, it created a potential problem by creating a "new
and significant tension between Third Circuit and D.C. Circuit precedent."'
Similarly, CompTel maintained that the FCC "correctly argue[d] that the
Third Circuit erred" when it ruled that Exemption 7(C) applies to the "interests
of large publicly traded corporations like AT&T."' 82 FOIA exemptions must be
narrowly interpreted because FOIA "embodies a policy authorizing liberal dis-
closure."' CompTel noted that the phrase "personal privacy" must be under-
stood within the context of privacy, a concept that applies inherently to indi-
viduals.'" Rather, the Third Circuit's ruling inappropriately "attribute[d] hu-
man emotions to corporations"' and such "resort to anthropomorphism [can]
not withstand scrutiny.""' CompTel reasoned that in expanding the scope of
Exemption 7(C) "to include a large, publicly traded corporation's right to con-
for AT&T, "the court of appeals has altered a tenet of FOIA law under which the govern-
ment has operated for decades. Federal agencies routinely collect information from compa-
nies as a result of law-enforcement or regulatory investigations. But agencies have never
considered, in processing FOIA requests, whether this information invades so-called corpo-
rate privacy interests.").
80 Id. at 29 ("[T]he decision will undoubtedly spawn objections [by private interests]
that desire the government's investigation of their possible malfeasance to remain secret ...
[and] will generate a new class of FOIA litigation by requesters seeking to restrict the as-
yet-undefined category of 'personal privacy' held by corporations."). Several public interest
groups-Public Citizen, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, The National
Security Archive, OpenTheGovernment.org, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, and The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press-filed an amici curiae brief in support of
granting writ of certiorari, arguing largely the point that corporate malfeasance will be
shielded from public view if the Third Circuit's decision is affirmed. See supra Part IV.
181 "The Third Circuit's unprecedented decision will therefore impose substantial legal
uncertainty on federal agencies attempting to process vast volumes of FOIA requests." Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners, supra note 152, at 29-30 (finding that this cre-
ates conflicting issues for agencies when requesters will be likely to file causes in D.C. Cir-
cuit Court while reverse FOIA actions will occur outside that jurisdiction in an effort to
enjoy the protection of corporate personal privacy protection).
182 Respondent CompTel's Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, FCC
v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279).
183 Id. at 1-2 (citing Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 220).
184 Brief of Respondent CompTel in Support of Petitioners at 9-10, FCC v. AT&T, Inc.,
562 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279).
s85 Respondent CompTel's Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 182, at 8.
186 Id. ("An artificial entity like a corporation cannot feel or show embarrassment or
disgrace. While a corporation's individual officers, directors or employees who are involved
in a law enforcement investigation might feel embarrassed, harassed or stigmatized if their
involvement was publicly disclosed, Exemption 7(C) would protect from disclosure any
records that could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of their
personal privacy.").
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trol information concerning itself improperly equates an individual's personal
privacy interest with a corporation's privacy interest."' CompTel argued that
the Third Circuit's interpretation contradicted the plain text of Exemption
7(C),'" which should be read in light of its "ordinary and everyday senses"" 9
and Exemption 7(C)'s legislative history.'" Further, the Third Circuit's deci-
sion contradicted legal precedent determining FOIA personal privacy exemp-
tions."' Accordingly, CompTel advocated reversal of the Third Circuit chiefly
because the holding is counter to the language and legislative goal of FOIA.*
2. AT&T Argues for Affirmance of the Third Circuit's Decision
AT&T maintained that the Third Circuit's decision correctly interpreted Ex-
emption 7(C) to include corporations within its scope of protection.' AT&T
asserted that the plain meaning of the "unambiguous" statutory text ultimately
should be the determining factor in this case.19 Agreeing with the Third Cir-
cuit, AT&T contended, "the 'plain text' of Exemption 7(C) 'unambiguously'
applies to corporations" based on FOIA's definition of "person."'" Because
Congress defined "person" to include corporations, Exemption 7(C)'s use of
18 Respondent CompTel's Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 182, at 3-4 (arguing that recognizing a corporate privacy interest in 7(C) is directly
counter to the U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (holding the "neither in-
corporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their
affairs in secret").
188 Id at 2; see also id. at 3 ("The defined term 'person' does not appear in Exemption
7(C) and the ordinary meaning of personal privacy does not encompass the privacy interests
of corporations."); Brief of Respondent Comptel, supra note 184, at 15.
189 Respondent CompTel's Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 182, at 2 (citing Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966)).
190 Id. at 3 (citing Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1988);
Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) for the proposition that Exemption 6
and 7(C) protect only individual interests); id. at 4 ("Even where the plain meaning of a
relevant statutory provision is sufficient to resolve a question, this Court nonetheless has
consulted the legislative history to confirm Congress' intent.") (citing Sims, 471 U.S. at 167-
68 (1985); id. at 7 (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) (stating that the same
words used in different parts of same statute generally presumed to have same meaning)).
'9' Id. at 2, 4.
192 Brief of Respondent CompTel in Support of Petitioners, supra note 184, at 31-35.
'93 Respondent AT&T Inc.'s Brief in Opposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
22-31, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279); see also
Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., at 8-13, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. -,131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011) (No. 09-1279).
194 Respondent AT&T Inc.'s Brief for Opposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 193, at 22-23.
195 Id. at 22; see also Brief for Respondent AT&T, Inc. supra note 193, at 14-18 (arguing
a corporation's personal privacy interests are covered by Exemption 7(C) because a corpora-
tion is a "person" for the purposes of FOIA, under the Administrative Procedure Act).
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the phrase "personal privacy" must also apply to corporations."' If Congress
wished to exclude corporations, it would have drafted Exemption 7(C) to use
the more restrictive term of "individual privacy" instead of "personal pri-
vacy."'" Similarly, AT&T rejected the notion that interpretation of Exemp-
tions 4 and 6 is determinative of Exemption 7(C)'s application.'" AT&T ar-
gued that Exemption 4 does not adequately protect corporate interests and, ac-
cordingly, Exemption 7(C) must apply to ensure the protection of "reputational
interests."' Furthermore, protection of corporations subject to law enforce-
ment investigations is consistent with the purpose underlying FOIA Exemp-
tions.200 Disclosure of corporate protected information would undercut the very
goal of Exemption 7(C).20'
AT&T asserted three reasons to urge the Supreme Court to affirm the Third
Circuit's judgment.202 First, AT&T contended that Supreme Court review is
not even necessary as the Third Circuit's opinion does not create a conflict of
authority with already existing case law interpreting FOIA Exemptions.203
Moreover, AT&T noted that corporations enjoy privacy rights in certain con-
stitutional contexts.2" For example, AT&T argued that notion of personal ju-
risdiction205 and Fourth Amendment protection206 apply to corporations. Sec-
ond, the Third Circuit's decision was interlocutory.20 Finally, AT&T argued
that the Third Circuit's decision had few consequences,200 with only an "insub-
196 Respondent AT&T Inc.'s Brief for Opposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 193, at 22-23.
197 Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., supra note 193, at 30 (noting that Exemption 7(F)
utilizes the word "individual").
198 Id. at 32-33, 39 (arguing that Exemption 6 does not exclude corporations, noting that
the Attorney General has invoked Exemption 6 to protect some corporate interest, and Ex-
emption 4 provides inadequate protection for corporate reputations).
1 Id. at 39 ("Exemption 4's limited protection for trade secrets and confidential com-
mercial information does not address the reputational interests that Exemption 7(C) pro-
tects.").
200 Id. at 41-42 (Exemption 7(C) is designed to extend privacy rights to all subjects of
law enforcement investigation, including corporations, in order to prevent embarrassment.).
20 Id. at 43 (subjecting corporations to the consequences of disclosure "cannot be
squared with [Exemption 7(C)'s] purpose").
202 Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., supra note 193, at 12-21.
203 Respondent AT&T Inc.'s Brief in Opposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 193, at 12-15, 29-30
204 Id. at 27-29; see also Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., supra note 193, at 20, 24-25.
205 Respondent AT&T Inc.'s Brief in Opposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 193, at 27.
206 Id. at 28.
207 Id. at 20.
208 AT&T argues that the public will not be denied necessary information under FOIA
because the relevant government agency must still balance the privacy interest protected
against the public interest in disclosure. If a corporation's privacy interest is outweighed by
the public's interest, then disclosure will still occur. See Brief for Respondent AT&T, Inc.
503
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
stantial" impact on FOIA request processing for agencies.29 Instead, AT&T
opined that failing to extend Exemption 7(C) protection to corporations would
decrease competition by granting competitors access to sensitive informa-
tion.210
3. Court Expresses Concern with Corporate Personhood at Oral Argument
During the January 19, 2011 argument before the Court, several Justices ap-
peared openly critical of affirming the Third Circuit's extension of Exemption
7(C) protection to corporations."' The Government presented similar argu-
ments, as articulated in its brief, advocating that the Court narrowly overturn
the Third Circuit.2 2 Only Justice Samuel Alito appeared willing to accept
AT&T's chief argument that the term "personal" has been used in other con-
texts to refer to corporate interests.2 3 The Government countered that the dis-
tinction between "person" and "personal" is more than grammatical. 2 4 Justices
Antonin Scalia and Sonia Sotomayor noted the Court's precedent of narrowly
construing FOIA exemptions in favor of disclosure.2"5 However, the Govern-
ment did alter its position somewhat, in anticipation of Milner v. Department
of the Navy,216 arguing that FOIA exemptions should not be read as narrowly
as possible.2 7 The Government cited more than thirty-five years of "uniform
agreement" that Exemption 7(C) applies to individuals only, emphasizing that
personal privacy interests are commonly understood as applicable to individu-
supra note 193, at 44-55.
209 Respondent AT&T Inc.'s Brief in Opposition of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 193, at 18-20.
210 Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., supra note 193, at 43.
211 Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: Losing on a privacy claim?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan.
19, 2011, 12:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/201 1/01/argument-recap-losing-on-a-
privacy-claim/; Adam Liptak, Court Weighs Whether Corporations Have Personal Privacy
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, January 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/us/20/privacy.html?_r-1 ("several justices said it was
too much of a leap to go from saying that corporations might be 'persons' for some purposes
to saying that their 'personal privacy' could be invaded").
212 Transcript of Oral Argument, at 3, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011) (No. 09-1279) (describing the Third Circuit's holding as "inconsistent with the text
of Exemption 7(C), FOIA's broader context, and the statute's drafting history, and would
lead to anomalous results").
213 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 212, at 4-5 (Justice Alito reasoned that "per-
sonal" can be used as a legal term of art to refer to a corporation, citing the Administrative
Procedure Act as an example.).
214 Id. at 5-6 (the government asserts that "although 'person' is used in certain legal con-
texts to refer to artificial persons and corporations and the like, 'personal' is not").
215 Id. at 10-11, 13.
216 562 U.S.- (2011)(09-1163) (holding that maps of explosives do not fall within the
scope of FOIA Exemption 2).
217 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 212, at 11.
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AT&T faced greater scrutiny, relying chiefly on the argument that "privacy
protections under FOIA are broader" than the statute's plain language.2 9
AT&T reasserted its central contention that, because "personal" is the adjective
form of "person"-a term defined to include a corporation-then "personal
privacy" should apply to corporations.220 Justice Ginsburg queried whether
extending Exemption 7(C)'s scope to cover corporations would entitle similar
protections to foreign, state, and local governments.22' Justice Scalia also in-
quired what corporate activity deserved privacy protection.222 AT&T argued
that internal corporate communications, for example remarks regarding an in-
dustry regulator or customer, that were made in confidence warranted protec-
tion.223 Scalia called the application of personal privacy to corporations "a very
strange" concept. 24 Chief Justice John Roberts suggested that FOIA Exemp-
tions were already sufficient, as individuals within a corporation are protected
under Exemption 7(C). 2 5 Further, Justice Stephen Breyer questioned whether
the protection of corporate privacy is even necessary.226 Justice Ginsburg cited
examples of legislative history, interpreting Exemption 7(C) to exclude corpo-
rations. 27 Similarly, Scalia challenged AT&T to meet its burden to demon-
strate that FOIA Exemptions indeed apply to corporations and were intended to
do so.228 Focusing his attention to AT&T's statutory interpretation, Justice Ro-
berts rejected AT&T's grammatical argument, finding that often "the adjective
is very different from its root." 229 This prompted AT&T to back away from the
grammatical imperative terminology of its brief230 Finally, Justice Sotomayor
expressed concern that expanding Exemption 7(C)'s scope to corporations
would jeopardize the current interpretation of other Exemptions, notably Ex-
emption 6.231
218 Id. at 16, 19.
219 Id. at 23.
220 Id. at 23, 25.
221 Id. at 23-24 (noting her view that an expansion of the scope of Exemption 7(C) to
include different forms of government would be problematic).
222 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 212, at 26.
223 Id. at 24, 26-27.
224 Id. at 26.
225 Id. at 28-29.
226 Id. at 29-30 (reasoning that there are no examples of invasion of corporate privacy
interests in FOIA disclosure because any legitimate corporate privacy interests "are actually
taken care of by the other 17 exemptions").
227 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 212, at 32.
228 Id. at 34-35.
229 Id. at 35-36 (Chief Justice Roberts stating, "I don't think there's much to the argu-
ment that because 'person' means one thing, 'personal' has to be the same relation.").
230 Id. at 36.
231 Id. at 38.
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4. The Supreme Court Finds No Corporate Protection Under Exemption
7(C)
In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court
reversed the Third Circuit, holding that Exemption 7(C)'s personal privacy
protection does not extend to corporations.2 3 2 The Court rejected AT&T's
grammar and usage argument because, while the meaning of adjectives can
relate to corresponding nouns, adjectives can "acquire distinct meanings of
their own" independent of the corresponding noun.' Highlighting that "in
ordinary usage, a noun and its adjective form may have meanings as disparate
as any two unrelated words," the Court found that the word "personal" has
"developed along its own etymological path" independent of its corresponding
noun, "person."234 Instead, the Court endorsed FCC's reading of Exemption
7(C) that excludes personal privacy protection for corporations.' The Court
noted that FOIA only defines the term "person" and the remainder of the stat-
ute must be read by giving undefined terms their "ordinary meaning."236
The Court supported its Exemption 7(C) interpretation in six ways. First, the
ordinary usage of "personal" relates to individuals, not corporations or other
artificial entities.' Second, dictionary definitions of "personal" confirm the
ordinary usage relating only to individuals.238 Third, the statutory context
strengthens an interpretation of "personal" as referring to individuals.239 De-
spite the fact that legally the term "person" often can denote an artificial entity,
the Court found "little support" for that argument that "personal" legally di-
verges from its common meaning to refer to corporations.240 Exemption 7(C)
uses the word "personal" as part of the larger phrase "personal privacy."24' The
use of the two words together "suggests a type of privacy evocative of human
232 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1186. All members of the Court, with the exception
of Justice Elena Kagan who did not participate, joined in Chief Justice Robert's opinion.
233 Id. at 1181-82 (citing "crab" and "crabbed", "corn" and "corny", and "crank" and
"cranky" as examples of adjectives and their respective corresponding nouns that differ
significantly in meaning and usage).
234 Id. at 1182.
235 Id
236 Id (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1267 (2010) (slip.
Op., at 4)).
237 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1182. (providing examples where personal only
refers to individuals and observing "[i]n fact, we often use the word 'personal' to mean pre-
cisely the opposite of business-related") (emphasis in original).
238 Id
239 Id. at 1182-1183.
240 Id. at 1183 (finding that the concepts of personal jurisdiction and personal privilege
for a corporation are insufficient to support an argument for corporate personal privacy).
241 Id. (noting that AT&T's reading of the statute to be the sum of two words is mis-
guided as "two words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in
isolation").
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concerns-not the sort usually associated with an entity like, say, AT&T."242
Next, secondary sources contemporary to Congress' drafting of Exemption
7(C) did not understand "personal privacy" as applicable to corporations.243
However, the Court narrowed its consideration of corporate rights by asserting
that this case does not require comment on corporate privacy interests at a con-
stitutional or common law level. 2"
Finally, the language of the remaining FOIA Exemptions supports an under-
standing of "personal privacy" applying only to individuals.245 Because Con-
gress drafted Exemption 7(C) within the framework of the already existing
FOLA Exemptions 4 and 6, it is clear that Congress intended Exemption 7(C)
to apply only to individuals.246 Congress utilized Exemption 6's language in
Exemption 7(C) "in a nearly identical manner," demonstrating that Congress
wanted the Exemption 7(C) personal privacy right to pertain only to individu-
als.2 47 Moreover, the Court reasoned that Congress used inherently different
language when referring to corporations.2 48 For example, the corporate-focused
Exemption 4 uses only the defined term "person," not "personal privacy."249
Consequently, the government has consistently read Exemption 7(C) to ex-
clude corporations.250 The Court closed its opinion in jest, stating "We trust
that AT&T will not take it personally."251
242 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1183.
243 Id. at 1183-1184 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6521, Comment c (1976)
and W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 97, pp. 641-642 (2d ed. 1955) for the proposition that corpo-
rations can not enjoy personal privacy rights).
244 Id. at 1184 ("The discrete question before us is ... whether Congress used the term
'personal privacy' to refer to the privacy of artificial persons in FOIA Exemption 7(C).").
245 Id
246 Id
247 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1184 (Exemption 6 is "regularly referred to . . . as
involving an 'individual's right of privacy."').
248 Id at 1185.
249 Id. at 1185 (drawing a distinction between Exemption 4 and Exemption 7(C) in terms
of scope based upon statutory language).
250 Id. at 1185 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney's General's Memorandum on the
1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act 9, reprinted in House Committee on
Government Operations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Freedom of Information
Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 507, 579 (t. Comm.
Print 1975) (FOIA Exemption's use of "personal privacy" "pertains to the privacy interests
of individuals").
251 Id. at 1185.
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IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXTENDING EXEMPTION 7(C)
PROTECTION TO CORPORATIONS
A. The Future of FOIA & Government Transparency
In deciding the case upon the grounds that it did, the Supreme Court failed
to address a number of potential consequences that could result from expand-
ing or curtailing corporate statutory rights under FOIA.252 Corporations with a
privacy interest under Exemption 7(C) could be more willing to participate in
government investigations253 and, without such concrete protection, corpora-
tions may be more apt to only participate if the corporation is forced to by
court ordered subpoena.254 Alternately, small businesses, especially those
whose individual owners are closely aligned with the corporation itself, may be
disproportionately harmed by disclosure.255
The Court's opinion also failed to note the potential chilling effect of the
Third Circuit decision. First, FOIA is a crucial tool of journalists.256 Any im-
pact on FOIA will undoubtedly change the way journalists obtain information
from the government257 and monitor the government's investigative and en-
forcement responses to wrongdoing.258 The recent government-led investiga-
252 Garrett Epps, Chief Justice John Roberts: Word Nerd, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/chief-justice-john-roberts-word-
nerd/71902/ (asserting that the court could have looked at the purpose of the statute or legis-
lative history to inform their decision, instead "Roberts starts and finishes in the reference
section").
253 Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 1995).
254 Id. at 813; see also Brief for Respondent AT&T Inc., supra note 193, at 43-44; see
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in
support of Respondent AT&T Inc. at 23-24, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S.-, 131 S. Ct.
1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279) (asserting that corporations "have been exceptionally proactive
in ferreting out misconduct within their ranks, disciplining those responsible and implement-
ing policies and procedures to prevent future wrongdoing").
255 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 254, at 24 (arguing that courts
will face difficulty in attempting to "disentangle" individual from corporate privacy, in ap-
plying Exemption 7(C)).
256 Editorial, Critics Say New Rule Limits Access to Records, supra note 7.
257 Amici pointed to several important documents that would have never reached the
public if Exemption 7 recognized corporate personal privacy. Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari for Public Citizen et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 62; see also
The National Security Archive, FOIA in the News-2004-2006,
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/foialstories.htm (last visited May 14, 2011) (listing news
stories from 2004-2006 that contained information obtained through the use of FOIA).
258 See Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and
Twenty Two Media Organizations in Support of Petitioners at 3-5, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562
U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279).; see also id at 18 ("creating a new category
of privacy for corporations would create a severe impediment to journalists (as well as vari-
ous public interest stakeholders) that depend on FOIA to enable their 'watchdog' function of
monitoring government agencies and their regulatory functions and through them the corpo-
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tions of Goldman Sachs, the BP oilrig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, and the
West Virginia mine explosion provide poignant examples of the power of
FOIA.259 The public has an interest in knowing how the government reacts to
crises and whether such responses adequately address such crises.2" For this
reason, corporate exemptions from FOIA disclosures under Exemption 7(C)
would disserve the public's best interests and safety. 6
Circuit courts must not interpret or view FOIA Exemptions through a differ-
ent lens than currently provided by precedent for three reasons. First, agencies
would be forced to develop new procedures in order to comply with novel ju-
dicial interpretations.262 Second, the potential for extensive litigation presents
concerns for requesters with limited resources263 and increases the burden on
already busy and resource strapped agencies. 2' Finally, and more worrisome,
agencies could likely become less willing to disclose as a means to avoid cost-
ly litigation all together. "
rate power structure"); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Public Citizen et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 62, at 8. ("FOIA is the public's strongest
tool for holding government agencies accountable in the performance of their oversight and
regulatory functions").
259 Id. at 8-9. The investigation of Goldman Sachs centers on the corporation's potential
misuse of taxpayer bailout money. See, e.g., Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C.
Accuses Goldman of Fraud in Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at Al. BP and
Halliburton have been accused of failing to follow proper safety regulations. See, e.g., Hen-
ry Fountain & Tom Zeller Jr., Panel Suggests Signs of Trouble Before Rig Blast, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A18. Massey Coal allegedly failed to meet several safety rules in
connection with the West Virginia mining tragedy that caused the death of 29 mine employ-
ees. See, e.g., Daniel Heyman, Safety Violations Are Cited in 2 West Virginia Mine Deaths,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2006, at Al0; see also Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press, et al., supra note 258, at 18-32.
260 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Public Citizen et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 62, at 8-9; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 16, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562
U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279). ("[E]xtending [Exemption 7(C)] protection
to corporate entities would deny the public access to broad categories of records that reveal
the operations of government and how it exercises its oversight of corporate activities.").
261 See generally, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Public Citizen et al. as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 62, at I (expressing strong concern that "the decision
below threatens the public's access to government records concerning agency oversight of
corporate activity and diminishes government transparency").
262 Had corporate rights under FOIA been redefined, "massive administrative effort to
process and litigate the newly" defined rights would have resulted. Reply Brief for the Unit-
ed States at l1, FCC v. AT&TInc., 562 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (No. 09-1279).
263 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Public Citizen et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 62, at 12-13 (noting that requesters often lack resources to pursue
litigation in response to an agency's denial of a FOIA request and that requested information
may be time sensitive and rendered moot should litigation take months or years).
264 Id. (describing litigation following an agency's denial of request as taxing on the
agency).
265 Id. at 9-11. For example, the Food and Drug Administration's Office of Regulatory
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As a matter of public policy, courts must preserve and protect FOIA as an
effective means to "ensure an informed citizenry."266 Government-held records
regarding "safety violations at a coal mine, environmental problems at an off-
shore oil rig, conditions at a food manufacturing plant, underhanded financial
deals at an investment bank" and the like could never reach public or media
view267 had the Court failed to reverse the Third Circuit.268
Affairs has been very forthcoming with disclosure of inspection reports and warning letters
to companies. See Food and Drug Administration's Office of Regulatory Affairs, Electronic
Reading Room,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/centersoffices/ORA/ORAElectronicReadingRoom/default.ht
m (last visited May 14, 2011); see also FDA, Warning Letters,
www.fda.gov/ICECL/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last visited May 14,
2011). Other agencies, such as the United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and
Inspection Services, publish similar documents. See Food Safety and Inspection Services,
Quarterly Enforcement Reports,
www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/QuarterlyEnforcement-Reports/index.asp (last
visited May 14, 2011).
266 Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 242 (FOIA is "needed to check against cor-
ruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed"); accord Reporters Comm.
For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 773 (FOIA provides a means for the public to know
"what [the] government is up to.").
267 Greg Stohr, Company Privacy Rights Get Review at U.S. High Court, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 28, 2010 2:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-28/company-privacy-
rights-get-review-in-u-s-supreme-court-case.html (noting that the Court's ultimate ruling
has an impact on pending FOIA litigation in response to Bloomberg LP's request to the
Federal Reserve Board to disclosure documents identifying banks that benefited from fed-
eral government bailout money).
268 Amol Mehra, Judging the Limits of the Rights of Corporations, RIGHTRESPECT (Oct. 4,
2010), http://www.rightrespect.com/2010/10/04/judging-the-limits-of-the-rights-of-
corporations/
("[U]nless the Supreme Court reverses the lower court decision, records about safety
violations at a coal mine, environmental problems at an offshore oil rig, conditions at a
food manufacturing plant, underhanded financial deals at an investment bank and many
other records like these may be the subject of corporate privacy claims that could result
in agencies withholding those records from the public under FOIA.")
See also Courtney Minick, More Rights for Corporations? On the Docket: ATT v. FCC,
JUSTIA.COM: LAw, TECHNOLOGY & LEGAL MARKETING (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://onward.justia.com/2010/10/07/more-on-the-rights-of-corporations-att-v-fcc/ ("Critics
worry that if corporations are able to use privacy concerns to prevent disclosure, they will
abuse this exemption to obscure information that the public has a right to know and cover up
bad behavior."); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Public Citizen et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 62, at 6 (arguing "records concerning the government's
oversight of meat processing and its response to a poor inspection result that a company
might find 'embarrassing' are records of significant importance to the public and fall within
the core of FOIA's purpose."); see also id at 7 (arguing that Exemption 7 could "prevent or
delay the public from accessing these records despite the public's undeniably strong interest
in information that the companies might find embarrassing, such as how the government is
responding to inadequate quality of care, insufficient staffing levels, or a poor health inspec-
tion. Indeed, knowing how the government regulates and monitors industries such as meat
processing and health care is central to the purpose of FOIA.").
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B. Modem Trends Suggest an Expansion of Corporate Rights & Personhood
Several commentators characterized AT&T Inc. v. FCC as centering on the
question of whether a corporation has the "legal status of a person."269 Much of
this commentary analogizes this case to the controversial Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.27 Before AT&T Inc. v. FCC was decided, there
were several predictions that corporate rights would continue to expand.27'
1. Comparison of Citizen's United & Other Corporate-Friendly Decisions to
AT&T Inc. v. FCC
However, it is important to note that there are significant differences be-
tween Citizens United and AT&T Inc. v. FCC.272 In Citizens United, Justice
269 Sara Jerome, Supreme Court to decide if AT&T is a person, THE HILL (Sept. 29,
2010, 11:18 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/121585-supreme-
court-to-weigh-atat-v-fcc; see generally, Scott Hartman, Privacy, Personhood, and the
Courts: FOIA Exemption 7(C) in Context, YALE L.J. 120 (Sept. 13, 2010, 9:55 AM),
http://ssm.com/abstract=1684498 (arguing "a more nuanced understanding of the concept of
privacy [that recognizes privacy only applies to individuals] - as it is employed in both
FOIA and elsewhere in American law - would have led the Third Circuit to conclude that
Exemption 7(C) is inapplicable to AT&T").
270 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) ; Sara
Jerome, supra note 269 ("A controversial decision last year loosened campaign finance
restrictions on the grounds that corporations are just groups of people, so they should not
face certain election rules that individuals do not face. Lyle Denniston at SCOTUSBLOG says
this case is similar but involves 'personal privacy' rather than campaign finance."); see also
Lyle Denniston, A review of "state secrets", SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 28, 2010 10:26 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/09/a-review-of-state-secrets/ (observing the "heavy politi-
cal controversy" following the Court's treatment of corporations as "persons" in Citizens
United and suggesting AT&T Inc. v. FCC may have similar implications because the Court
is again considering corporations as "persons" statutorily). Dissenting in Citizens United,
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for failing to recognize "corporations have no con-
sciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. . . . They are not themselves mem-
bers of 'We the People' by whom and for whom our Constitution was established." Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting); contra Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens
United v. FEC: The First Amendment Rights of Corporate "Persons," PROFESSORBAIN-
BRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010)
http://www.Professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v-
fec-the-first-amendment-rights-of-corporate-persons.html (arguing that corporations must be
likened to individual persons in order to provide for legal rights).
271 See, e.g. Dahlia Lithwick, Privacy Rights Inc.: Your right to personal privacy is
shrinking even as Corporate America's is growing, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2010 6:42 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2270956 ("[G]iven the Supreme Court's solicitude for the First
Amendment rights of corporations in Citizens United, perhaps it's time to recognize that for
purposes of privacy rights, corporations are now people, too.").
272 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 885 (concerning constitutional rights of corporations in
relation to campaign finance laws); compare FCC v. AT&T Inc., 582 F.3d 490 (concerning
the statutory personhood rights of corporations under the Freedom of Information Act).
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Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, 273 and
Thomas, in holding that corporations are entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion for political speech.274 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Gins-
burg, and Sotomayor disagreed with the majority's opinion in a particularly
lengthy and vehement dissent.275 During oral arguments for Citizens United,
Justice Sotomayor made strong statements that suggested she disagreed with
previous Supreme Court decisions that give corporations the same legal recog-
nitions as persons.27
When viewed in light of the Court's decisions under Chief Justice Roberts277
and his predecessor Chief Justice Rehnquist, AT&T Inc. v. FCC contrasts sev-
eral opinions that favor corporate interests.278 While corporations appear to be
273 While Justice Scalia was a supporter of corporate rights in Citizens United, his vote in
AT&T Inc. v. FCC can be reconciled in that he previously advocated for the narrow con-
struction of FOIA exemptions. Before ascending to the High Court, Scalia testified before
the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, arguing that Exemption 7(C) cannot be applied
to corporations. I Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On the Con-
stitution of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong., I st Sess. 957-958 (198 1) ("per-
haps the most significant feature" of Exemption 7(C) is that it's scope is limited to exclude
to corporations).
274 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929.
275 See id.
276 Marcia Coyle, Brief of the Week: Another Citizens United? These groups hope not.,
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (June 9, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202462348296&slreturn=I&hbxlogin=
1 (suggesting the Court may have previously erred in "imbu[ing] a creature of State law
with human characteristics" when treating corporations as individuals for the purpose of
campaign finance rules); Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Citizens United, 558 U.S.
-, 130 S. Ct. 929 (2010).
277 See Leo Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Is the Roberts Court
Pro-Business? (December 17, 2010),
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/RobertsBusiness.pdf at 2-3; see also The Rob-
erts Court and Corporations: The Numbers Tell the Story, CONSTITUTION ACCOUNTABILITY
CENTER (June 2010), http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/Chamber-Win-Statistics-formatted-end-of-term-6-25-final.pdf
278 See generally Amol Mehra, supra note 268; accord Daily Editorial Board, Corps
don't need personal privacy: The Supreme Court could grant corporations more secrecy
this term., THE MINNESOTA DAILY (Oct. 5, 2010),
http://www.mndaily.com/2010/10/05/corps-donE2%80%99t-need-personal-privacy (ob-
serving that "after the ill-advised Citizens United ruling, the importance of any Supreme
Court case cannot be overestimated" because "in that case, the Court, instead of reaching a
decision with narrow and specific implications, took a small case and used it to fundamen-
tally alter our democracy"). Also before the Court this term, Boeing Company v. United
States and General Dynamics Corp. v. United States present issues involving the state se-
crets privilege and its application to contract disputes between the military and defense con-
tractors. Commentators assert these cases have the potential to further expand corporate
rights. See generally, Adam Liptak and Duff Wilson, Justice to Examine Rights of Corpora-
tions, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 28, 2010, at A20 ("Continuing to explore the limits of corporations'
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court on Tuesday added cases to its docket that will test
the scope of companies' rights to due process and privacy."). Thompson v. North American
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enjoying expanding rights, rights for individuals are shrinking.2 79 However, the
Court's specific narrowing of AT&T Inc. v. FCC's holding to affect merely
Exemption 7(C) interpretation280 could still leave corporations an opportunity
to assert a personal privacy right in a different, non-Exemption 7(C) context.28'
2. Extension of Corporate Personhood Rights is Problematic
The Third Circuit's decision represented a resounding affirmation of the no-
tion of personhood rights for corporations.282 in protecting certain corporate
disclosures, FOIA can be a means to encourage corporate participation in gov-
ernment investigations.283 However, the Third Circuit's reading of Exemption
Stainless, considering whether the legal protections granted to corporate whistle blowers
extend to family members, and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, considering the applicability
of an arbitration agreement imposed by a corporation in its user agreement, also impact
corporate interests. See generally, Sean Silverthorne, How the New Supreme Court Could
Change the Way You Do Business, BNET (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.bnet.com/blog/harvard/how-the-new-supreme-court-could-change-the-way-you-
do-business/8572 ("potential to remake a bit of the business landscape"); Noah Feldman and
Martha Minow, The Supreme Court's new dynamic: Law school leaders gauge debut of
former colleague Elena Kagan, and the import of upcoming cases, HARVARD GAZETTE (Oct.
4, 2010), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/10/supremecourtnew dynamic/
(querying whether the Roberts Court will "continue a trend in which [the Court has] ex-
tended corporate power in the face of federal legislation that has sought to limit or restrict
federal power").
279 See Dahlia Lithwick, supra note 271 (noting as troubling the "growing deference to
trembling corporate sensitivity would be merely amusing were it not for the fact that, as the
idea of corporate privacy and dignity catches hold in the American judiciary, basic notions
of privacy and dignity for actual human beings seem to be on the wane"); Adam Cohen,
Why Companies Don't Deserve Personal Privacy Rights, TIME (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2037195,00.html (noting that rights of indi-
vidual people have been scaled back in "sex-discrimination claims, challenges to cruel pris-
on conditions and other lawsuits involving wronged human beings").
280 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1184.
281 See generally Amol Mehra, supra note 268 (interpreting Citizens United to "aggran-
dize[] the power of corporations and interest groups at the expense of candidates, political
parties and true democracy"); see also Courtney Minick, supra note 268 ("This term, the
Court has the opportunity to extend even more rights to corporations"); Noah Feldman and
Martha Minow, supra note 278 (describing Citizens United as expansively holding "when it
came to free speech rights, corporations would be treated more or less like individuals"); see
generally Lyle Denniston, Commentary: Privacy, in different settings, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar.
2, 2011 7:41 PM EST) http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/03/commentary-privacy-in-
different-settings/ (noting that notions of privacy depend on context); see also generally
Kevin Goldberg, Swami Reigns Supreme, Reins Supremes, CoMMLAWBLOG (Mar. 1, 2011)
http://www.commlawblog.com/tags/fcc-v-att/.
282 David T. Blonder, Court Properly Protects Businesses' Privacy Rights in Context of
FOJA Request, 18 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 29, 2 (2009) ("This ruling appears to
be an important and principled victory for corporate privacy rights.").
283 Id ("To encourage corporations to cooperate in government investigations, these
statutory protections are necessary to prevent the potentially damaging disclosure of pro-
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7(C) "warp[ed]" the very notion of personal privacy in applying it to corpora-
tions.2 8 Corporations already receive adequate protection from other FOIA
Exemptions, most notably Exemption 4.2"5 Congress drafted Exemption 4 spe-
cifically with an eye to preventing the type of competitive disadvantages that
AT&T was concerned CompTel would gain through its FOIA request.28 6
Moreover, publicly traded corporations are required by law to disclosure cer-
tain financial and operational information to the public.
Recognizing personal rights of corporations is problematic because the cor-
porate form exists merely to limit the liability of investors.287 Further, corpora-
tions are typically treated differently because they are not citizens."' Privacy as
a legal concept is best suited to the application to individual persons.2 8 9 The
Supreme Court observed that the notion of privacy "encompass[es] the indi-
vidual's control of information concerning his or her person."290 Privacy is
unique in that it is innately tied to emotions.29 For this reason, it is more ap-
prietary and sensitive information to third parties with sometimes unclear intentions.").
284 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen et al. in Support of Petitioners supra note 62, at
6; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, et
al., supra note 260, at 23 ("recognizing corporate privacy interests under Exemption 7(C)
would grant corporations greater rights and protections than individuals currently enjoy
under the FOIA").
285 Exemption 4 protects against the disclosure of "trade secrets and commercial or fi-
nancial information." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
286 "Exemption 4 is designed to 'protect[] persons who submit financial or commercial
data to government agencies from ... competitive disadvantages." Brief of Amici Curiae
Public Citizen et al. in Support of Petitioners supra note 62, at 7 (citing Nat'l Parks & Con-
servation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
287 See generally Noah Feldman and Martha Minow, supra note 278 (characterizing ATT
v. FCC as considering the question of "Do you treat a corporation as something special? Or
do you treat a corporation as though it were a human being?"); Mehra, supra note 268
("corporations are bundles of private interests sometimes incompatible with public interests,
and have uniquely disproportionate power.").
28 Amol Mehra, supra note 268 (describing corporations as not "traditional citizens"
because they do not vote); Adam Cohen, supra note 279 (noting for only some purposes,
including the ability to own property or enter into contracts, are corporations treated as indi-
viduals); see Mark Walsh, Corporate Rights Are Again at Issue as AT&T Wants to Keep
Info a Secret, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2011 2:40 AM CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/corporate rights areagainatissueasatt w
ants to keepinfo_a_secret/ (noting a distinction between the treatment of corporations and
individuals for personal privacy issues).
289 A. Breckenridge, The Right to Privacy 1 (1970) ("Privacy, in my view, is the rightful
claim of the individual to determine the extent to which he wishes to share himself with
others. . . . It is also the individual's right to control dissemination of information about
himself.").
290 Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 763.
291 Scott Hartman, supra note 269, at 386 (asserting that harm suffered by an individual
because of disclosure is "fundamentally different from the harm that a corporation suffers
under similar circumstances"); id. at 108 (noting that a corporation may lose revenue while
a person loses "control of the discernment of information concerning their person ... impli-
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propriate to describe the interests of a corporation in terms of property law.292
The Court has noted that corporations are legal fictions and, thereby, do not
warrant the same levels of protection as individuals.293
V. CONCLUSION
American democracy treasures government transparency as a core value-
one crucial to ensuring government accountability. Congress affirmed the im-
portance of transparency with its passage of FOIA.294 However, Congress em-
phasized the significance of individual privacy as an equally important consid-
eration in American life when it amended FOIA to include nine privacy Ex-
emptions to disclosure.295
Recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, AT&T Inc. v. FCC
considered the scope and extent of FOIA Exemption 7(C).296 Specifically, the
case addressed whether Exemption 7(C) protects corporate personal privacy
interests.29 7 AT&T Inc. v. FCC presented a significant watershed moment for
the Court to highlight good public policy, namely ensuring that FOIA remains
a vehicle of citizen access to government held information298 and to veer away
from its controversial trend of judicial activism in favor of corporate rights and
personhood.299 Instead, the Court's opinion devoted its attention solely to the
use of grammar and common usage to dictate statutory interpretation. Al-
though the Court decided correctly by narrowly interpreting "personal privacy"
as applicable only to individuals, it should have based its decision on the im-
portance of FOIA to American democracy and the alarming trend of expansion
of corporate personhood.
Given the power of corporations as a driving force in the global economy,
issues of corporation personhood and autonomy will continue to emerge before
courts. However, in AT&T Inc. v. FCC the Supreme Court failed to seize an
opportunity to reaffirm the important values of government transparency and
cat[ing] the subject's thoughts, sentiments, and emotions"').
292 Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World: An Ar-
gument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1697, 1703 (1995) ("Any privacy interests
that a corporation does possess" are that of "property interests rather than intimate personal
rights.").
293 Fifth Amendment protections are not extended to corporate documents and records as
corporations are "'creature[s] of the State,' with powers limited by the State." Braswell v.
United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102, 104-105 (1988) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
294 Infra Part I-II.
295 Infra Part 1-1.
296 Infra Part III.
297 Infra Part Ill.
298 Infra Part IV.
299 Infra Part Tv-v.
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accountability in the face of private interests.
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